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A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE QTIP
TRUST AND THE UNLIMITED MARITAL
DEDUCTION
JOSEPH M. DODGE*

Professor Lawrence Zelenak's article, Taking Critical Tax
Theory Seriously,1 scores many points, but I am nevertheless moved
to critique the part of the article that relates to the QTIP trust and
the marital deduction. I also have some bones to pick with feminist
scholarship in this area, namely, its innuendos of a male chauvinist
plot, its general inattention to the QTIP trust problem, its
acquiescence in the unlimited marital deduction, and its failure to
come up with a plausible solution. The foregoing critiques tend to
validate Professor Zelenak's thesis that critical tax scholarship
betrays a "whiner" mentality: (1) critical tax scholarship obsesses
over tax provisions it does not like while ignoring the larger context,
and (2) it is weak on plausible solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION

The full value of the OTIP trust2 qualifies for the gift or estate
tax marital deduction even though the transferee spouse (herein the
"wife" or "widow") 3 has only a right to income for life, with no powers
* William H. Francis, Jr. Professor, University of Texas School of Law. Harvard
University (B.A., 1963; LL.B., 1967); New York University (LL.M. in taxation, 1973).
1. 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521 (1998).
2. "QTIP" stands for "qualified terminable interest property." The provisions that
qualify QTIP trusts, see I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7), 2523(f) (West Supp. 1998), are exceptions to
the so-called "terminable interest rule," which holds that an interest which, as of the date
of transfer, might terminate, lapse, or fail pursuant to a condition (precedent or
subsequent) does not qualify for the marital deduction, see id. §§ 2056(b)(1), 2523(b).
Without the QTIP qualification rule, an income interest for life in the wife or widow
would not qualify for the marital deduction because it lapses on the death of the wife or
widow.
3. The transferee herein is deemed to be the wife, because husbands statistically are
richer but have shorter life spans than wives. Statistics on survival are cited in U.S. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, 91ST CONG., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 260 (Comm.
Print 1969) [hereinafter TAX REFORM PROPOSALS 1969]. Moreover, the feminist
literature deems the transferee to be the wife or widow and the transferor to be the
husband. See Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers," 10

LAW & INEQ. J. 137, 156-59 (1991); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP
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of disposition or control.4 The "price" to be paid for full qualification
for the marital deduction is that the QTIP trust property is included
in the wife's unified estate and gift tax base,5 although the burden of
the tax "on" the QTIP trust is usually borne by the trust itself and not
the wife's own estate.6
Both the QTIP trust device and the unlimited marital deduction
entered the estate and gift tax as a "package" in the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 19817 ("ERTA"). The link between the two
was explicit.' Previously, to qualify for the marital deduction the
husband had to give the wife, at a minimum, not only an income
interest for life but also a general power of appointment, that is, an
unrestricted power of inter vivos or testamentary disposition.9 At the
same time, under pre-ERTA law (and simplifying matters somewhat)
the amount of the marital deduction could not exceed half of the gift,
or half of the husband's net estate.'0 The pre-ERTA marital
deduction was designed (although poorly) to allow a tax-free splitting
of the aggregate marital estate, similar to the result achieved
automatically (and without tax) in the case of community property
upon divorce.
With an unlimited marital deduction, the husband can reduce his
taxable estate to zero by leaving his entire gross estate in the form of
Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301, 305 n.11
(1995).
4. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7)(B), 2523(f)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1998).
5. See id. §§ 2044, 2519 (1994 & West Supp. 1998). The terminable interest rule,
described supra in note 2, is aimed at preventing qualification for transfers that might not
appear in the estate and gift tax base of the transferee spouse, but QTIP transfers qualify
because of their statutory inclusion in the estate or gift tax base of the wife or widow.
6. See id. § 2207A (West Supp. 1998) (providing that a spouse or spouse's estate has
a right of recovery against transferee of QTIP transfer).
7. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172, 301-05 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§§ 2044, 2207A, 2519 (1994 & West Supp. 1998)).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 97-201, at 159-60 (1981), reprintedin 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105,
258-59.
9. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(5), 2523(e) (West Supp. 1998). There is also the "estate
trust" in which no distribution can be made to any person other than the widow during
her life, and on her death the trust property is payable to her estate. The estate trust does
not mandate any distributions to the widow during life, but qualifies because it is not a
terminable interest. This result appears to have been an accidental by-product of
technical statutory language, rather than the outcome of an explicit policy decision by
Congress. See S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 28 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163
(omitting mention of estate trusts). The estate trust appears to be rarely used. See
DAviD WESTFALL & GEORGE P. MAIR, ESTATE PLANNING LAW AND TAXATION 13-15
(2d ed. 1989).
10. See RIcHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 5118 (5th ed. 1983). Also, the prior rule that an interest in community property could not
qualify for the gift and estate tax marital deduction was repealed.
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A more sophisticated

alternative is for the husband to make that amount of qualifying
marital deduction transfers as will reduce his taxable estate to that

amount (currently $625,000, but $1 million by the year 2006) that will
produce a tax which will be reduced to zero after subtracting the

unified transfer tax credit available to the husband's estate." Since
qualifying transfers will, unless consumed or wasted, appear in the

surviving spouse's transfer tax base, the current unlimited marital
deduction allows no transfer tax to be paid until the widow dies or
disposes of the property.
II. THE QTIP TRUST AND FEMALE EMPOWERMENT
Articles by Professors Mary Louise Fellows and Wendy C.
Gerzog have asserted that the QTIP arrangement is patriarchal in
motive and effect in that it deprives wives and widows of both
testamentary and management control over property.' This claimat least as it pertains to effect-is unassailable, because a QTIP trust
confers on the widow only an income interest for life, and the widow
has no power of disposition or control; the property passes to the
successive beneficiaries or remainders designated by the husband.
When the wife has little wealth of her own, the QTIP arrangement
effectively allows the husband to "use" the wife's unified transfer tax
credit for his own dispositive ends at the cost only of having to give
13
the wife an income-only interest in trust.
Professor Zelenak critiques the feminist position. His main
points are: (1) the QTIP trust is not demeaning to wives because it

11. The unified transfer tax credit in effect from 1986 through 1997 exempts from tax
the first $600,000 of a person's (lifetime plus deathtime) transfers. See I.R.C. §§ 2010,
2505 (West Supp. 1998). The exemption equivalent is $625,000 in 1998 and is scheduled
to increase (in steps) to $1 million in the year 2006. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 501(a), 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 788, 845 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 2010 (West Supp. 1998)). Thus, a husband (with no lifetime gifts) dying in 1997 with a
gross estate of $2 million could completely avoid tax by making a marital deduction
bequest of $1.4 million: $2 million gross estate less marital deduction of $1.4 million
equals taxable estate of $600,000, which produces no tax due to the unified transfer tax
credit.
12. See Fellows, supranote 3, at 156-59; Gerzog, supranote 3, at 305 n.11.
13. The husband can create minority-interest discounts in the estate of the widow.
For example, the husband owning a 60% control block can make an outright gift of one
30% minority interest to the wife, bequeath the remaining 30% minority interest to a
QTIP trust, and obtain minority-interest discounts in both estates. See Estate of Bonner
v. United States, 84 F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that stock in a QTIP trust is not
aggregated with a widow's other stock in the same corporation). This holding confirms
the view that property in a QTIP trust does not really belong to the widow.
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assumes that wives have a mind of their own, 4 (2) the issue should be
low on the list of feminist concerns because it affects only a small,
and wealthy, group of women, 5 and (3) an income interest may be
better than the alternatives.' 6 I view the first argument as irrelevant,
the second as rejecting important feminist values, and the third as
misguided (based on the wrong standard of comparison).
A. Effect Is More Important Than Intent
Feminists attack the QTIP trust arrangement on the ground that
it was motivated by male determination to prevent the widow from
controlling the devolution of the property. 7 This claim appears to be
overstated. The QTIP trust was always viewed as a trade-off for the
unlimited marital deduction.' The unlimited marital deduction is
assumed naturally (if superficially and indeed wrongly) to be
beneficial to wives and widows due to its allowance and its (apparent)
encouragement of an increase in qualifying marital deduction
bequests.
The QTIP concept appears to have surfaced first in the 1968 ALI
transfer tax proposal, which also recommended an unlimited marital
deduction and elimination of the terminable interest rule. 19 There
14. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1544-45.
15. See iL at 1548-49.
16. See id. at 1545-48.
17. See Gerzog, supra note 3, at 320-21 (citing statements from the 1950s and 60s).
Professor Gerzog attacks my alleged position that only QTIP transfers should qualify for
the marital deduction, thereby implying that I am a misogynist. See id. at 321. In the
passage cited, I was actually arguing against qualification for "estate trusts" (described
supra in note 9). See Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-toValue Lines, 43 TAX L. REV. 241, 352 (1988) [hereinafter Dodge, Redoing]. Of course, I
have always favored qualification for outright transfers. (I am more ambivalent towards
power-of-appointment trusts.) See id. at 345-46; see also Joseph M. Dodge, Further
Thoughts on Realizing Gains and Losses at Death, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1827, 1854-55 (1994)
(advocating that only outright transfers should qualify). In stating that the "QTIP
scheme" was "theoretically sound," I was arguing only that if a partial interest was to
entail qualification, it was better to give a deduction to the husband's estate equal to the
full value of the property subject to the partial interest followed by a full inclusion by the
widow. This is opposed to a deduction only for the value of the partial interest
transferred to the widow. For this reason I use the word "scheme" instead of
"qualification rule." See Dodge, Redoing, supra, at 350. My 1988 article explicitly
attacked the deduction-equals-value approach, which Professor Gerzog favors. See id. at
345-52; see also Gerzog, supra note 3, at 302 n.6 (advocating that "only the value of the
interest actually transferred to the surviving spouse should be eligible for the marital
deduction"). The deduction-equals-value approach is critiqued in the text accompanying
infra notes 88-92.
18. See TAX REFORM PROPOSALS 1969, supranote 3, at 359-60.
19. See AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTERS' STUDIES 33

(1969).
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was little discussion of the QTIP proposal, other than a statement
that it would allow the husband to protect his children from a prior
marriage. In a prior draft, it was argued that the widow's loss of
control would be compensated for by the income from the larger
marital trust allowed by the unlimited marital deduction.20 There was
also the notion that the package could be viewed as a simplification
measure. 21 A QTIP-type transfer was also proposed in the 1969
Treasury tax reform proposal, in which the stated rationale was that2
the federal government should not influence the form of transfers.
The 1969 Treasury proposal gave the transferee spouse ultimate
3
control over whether an income-only trust would be deductibleZ
Neither the ALI proposal nor the Treasury proposal was
adopted by the 1969 Tax Reform Act. What caused the appearance
of the QTIP provision in the 1981 legislation is hard to determine,
but it was clearly an afterthought to the unlimited marital deduction,
which was promoted for political reasons 4 Thus, it is difficult to
attribute to the 1981 Congress as a collective body a plot to deprive
women of property rights, although it is conceivable that some
legislators were aware of the effect of the 1981 package. There
appears to have been no public objection to the QTIP rules as they
passed through the legislative process, nor was there adverse reaction
20. See AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECr: MAJOR
PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN
REFERENCE THERETO 33 (1968).

21. See David Westfall, Revitalizing the FederalEstate and Gift Taxes, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 986, 1001 (1970). The technical problems at that time related to certain applications
of the terminable interest rule, the treatment of community property, what powers of
appointment qualified, computation of the limitation, and enforcement of the gift tax rule.
22. See TAX REFORM PROPOSALS 1969, supra note 3, at 359-60. This rationale for
the QTIP transfer is at odds with the statement that "the present treatment of taxing
transfers between spouses does not accord with the common understanding of most
husbands and wives that the property they have accumulated is 'ours.'" Id. at 358. It is a
strange concept of common ownership that allows one spouse alone to exercise
dispositive control.
23. Current law provides that the election is to be made by the donor or the deceased
spouse's executor. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(III), 2056(b)(7)(B)(v), 2523(f)(2)(C),
2523(f)(4) (West Supp. 1998).
24. It appears that the main impetus behind the 1981 changes was a political drive by
farmers and small business interests to emasculate the federal estate and gift tax. An
unlimited marital deduction furthered this aim. The QTIP provision was not in the early
bills, but emerged later from a task force controlled by Democrats on the House Ways
and Means Committee. The Democrats, who controlled the House, were engaged in a
tax-reduction bidding war with the Senate Republicans. The genesis of the marital
deduction provisions of the 1981 Act is discussed in Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Wealth
Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REv. 1183, 1198-1206 (1985), which cites the
proposed Family Enterprise Estate and Gift Tax Equity Act of 1980, which did not have a
QTIP rule.
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after enactment, even by feminists. Two male legal commentators
criticized (if obscurely) the QTIP trust shortly after the 1981 changes
became effective,25 but a feminist critique did not materialize until at
least ten years later.26 If even feminists did not recognize the
significance of the QTIP trust on female empowerment, it is hard to
attribute a sinister motive to (mostly) male legislators and policymakers, unless one assumes that male chauvinists are smarter and
more clever than feminists. Still, it is astonishing that after sixteen
years only two feminist legal scholars have objected in print to the
QTIP trust.27
There is no doubt that the QTIP device diminishes the autonomy
of wives and widows, who statistically are the usual beneficiaries of
QTIP trusts.' The wife or widow is deprived of any power to control
the disposition of the property, and the property is usually in trust,
which deprives her of administrative control. QTIP trusts implement
the husband's dead-hand control. Even if the welfare interests of
widows of wealthy husbands may in some cases be furthered by
trusts, it should be up to the widow herself to make the decision to
self-settle a trust, or perhaps to employ investment advisors.29 The
federal tax law allows QTIP trusts, and estate planners are more than
eager to use them. According to a recent survey, QTIP trusts are by
far the most commonly used form of marital deduction for wealthy
husbands.30 Given the existence of the options of outright transfers
and power-of-appointment trusts, it would appear that the estate
planning community (if not Congress) is deeply patriarchal in
outlook.3 '
25. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, TRUSTS, AND GIFTS
84-85 (Supp. 1982); Joel C. Dobris, MaritalDeduction Estate Planning: Variations on a
Classic Theme, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801, 818-21, 819 n.155 (1983); see also Henry M.
Ordower, Trusting Our Partners: An Essay on Resetting the Estate PlanningDefaults in
an Adult World, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 313, 320, 355-56 (1996) (arguing against
the common attitude that QTIP trusts should be the default choice in estate planning).
26. See Fellows, supra note 3. During the 1980s, I would often question in class the
effect of QTIP trusts on women. Typically there was no response, even though about half
of the students (on average) were women.
27. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 3.
29. See Ordower, supra note 25, at 338-39 (arguing that widows are not generally less
capable of managing wealth than men).
30. See Chris J. Prestofina, StrategiesRecommended by Experienced Estate Planners,
TR. & EST., Jan. 1994, at 47,50-51. The leading text on drafting marital deduction clauses
prefers the QTIP trust and includes only QTIP provisions in the forms section. See
RICHARD B. COVEY, MARITAL DEDUCTION AND CREDIT SHELTER DISPOSITIONS AND
THE USE OF FORMULA PROVISIONS 147-48, 195-204 (1984).
31. See Ordower, supra note 25, at 315 (stating that estate planners use QTIP trusts
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Nevertheless, Professor Zelenak downgrades the chauvinistic

culture of estate planning and the detrimental effect of QTIP trusts
on wives and widows by arguing that these phenomena only show
"respect" for the independent judgment of wives and widows, that is,
the possibility that wives and widows would in fact divert the
"husband's" property away from the objects of his bounty.32 But a
legal impediment motivated by fear (of the widow's dispositive
'33

power) can hardly be attributed to "respect for independence.

Such a claim is equivalent to arguing that the institution of slavery
was a manifestation of white respect for African-Americans. Some

respect! And, of course, the fear is often irrational or, at best,
anecdotal 4
In any case, the issue of motives for the enactment of the QTIP

trust, emphasized by Professors Zelenak, Fellows, and Gerzog, is
quite peripheral. What matters is the enormous constraints imposed

by the QTIP trust on women's control of wealth.
B. Do We CareAbout the Top Ten PercentWealthiest Women?
Professor Zelenak also responds to the attack on QTIP trusts by
pointing out that it is primarily the widows of rich husbands who are

disadvantaged by QTIP trusts.35 I confess that the point eludes me.
for half of their clients and indicating that the planner often recommends use of the QTIP
trust). Interestingly, the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (the "ACrEC")
promotes the view that an attorney is permitted to represent both husband and wife in
estate planning.
See AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRUST AND ESTATE COUNSEL,
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr 87-89 (2d ed.
1995). But the ACTEC appears not to recognize the possibility that recommending and
drafting a QTIP trust for the husband entails a conflict of interest with the wife. See id.;
see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CONFLICr OF INTEREST IN ESTATE PLANNING FOR
HUSBAND AND WIFE 15-19 (1994), reprintedin PROB. LAW., Summer 1994, at 1, 15-19
(pointing out that a husband and wife might have different ideas on how a husband should
dispose of his property).
32. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1544-45.
33. In a similar vein, it is argued that the reluctance of state legislatures to shift to
community property regimes also betrays husbands' fear of wives' ability to exercise the
power of disposition over half of the marital property. See Fellows, supra note 3, at 15156.
34. Thus, since widowers have a much greater chance of remarrying or acquiring
lovers than widows, it would seem that women would have a lot more to fear than men on
this score. Also, women may be less likely to disinherit their children than men. See
Ordower, supra note 25, at 339 n.64.
35. Surveys indicate that low- to moderate-income husbands generally desire to leave
all their property to their widows. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 70-71 (5th ed. 1995); Ordower, supra note 25, at 318-19.
Such transfers would typically be outright and free of trust, since trusts are uneconomical
except for large amounts of wealth.
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Reforming the tax system to favor the poor may be an objective of a
certain type of scholarship, but it is not per se a concern of feminism,
36
which favors economic self-determination for women of all classes.
Self-determination by wealthy women by way of economic
empowerment is important to allow such women to be role models
over time. The ability to manage investments and to responsibly
transfer wealth is as important an aspect of economic empowerment
as owning or running a business. A class can hardly exercise
economic power responsibly if it is not given the opportunity.
C. Do QTIP Trusts FurtherSpousal Welfare?
Although Professor Zelenak correctly points out that welfare
feminism often indicates different policy choices than autonomy
feminism, 37 it is not clear that such a conflict exists in the QTIP trust
area. Professor Zelenak's welfare argument suggests that a QTIP
trust may be a better deal (for the widow of a rich husband) than a
widow's right to elect against the will. Presumably this point is
inapplicable to community property states-which contain nearly a
third of the U.S. population 38 -in which the husband has
testamentary control over only half of the community property. In
any event, elective share statutes are the wrong baseline for
comparison. With the ability to enter into antenuptial agreements
and the ease with which divorce can be obtained, the cruder forms of
disinheritance of widows (inter vivos gifts, revocable trusts, and
single premium life insurance) are not a significant problem for most
couples.
The QTIP trust is itself a potent, if subtle, technique for the
disinheritance of widows. The lure of an income interest for life in a
large portion of the husband's estate may seduce the widow into
foregoing her inheritance rights. 9 Even an objective evaluation of
the QTIP trust may dictate that state law anti-disinheritance

36. See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral
GenderBiases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1026-29 (1993) (discussing the effect of
the "marriage penalty" under the income tax on upper income couples).
37. See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1560-61.
38. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNIrED STATES: 1996, at 35 (estimating 29% for the year 2000).
39. A widow's inheritance right, namely to claim one half or one third of the
husband's estate (however defined for this purpose) outright, is likely to be worth more
than an income-only interest in a QTIP trust. See infra text accompanying notes 59-67.
However, an unsophisticated layperson may well assume that an income-only interest is
worth half or more of the estate. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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remedies not be pursued.4° For the deceased husband, the retention
of dead-hand control of the property's devolution can be obtained at
a minimal price. In short, the QTIP trust offers marginal welfaretype benefits, at best, for widows, but allows husbands to reap
supermarginal benefits.
The appropriate baseline for evaluating the QTIP trust is the
norm of facilitating (if not mandating) equal estate-splitting, which
was the norm that informed the pre-ERTA marital deduction regime
and accords with the notion of wealth that is "shared." The preERTA regime did this crudely and in an excessively complex manner,
but that need not concern us here. Under pre-ERTA law, in order to
obtain the marital deduction, the husband had to leave the widow no
less than a power-of-appointment trust.41
III. THE QTIP TRUST CANNOT BE DEFENDED ON THE MERITS

Despite the foregoing, Professor Zelenak declares, without
elaboration, that he is "no great fan of the QTIP rules."'42 It would
seem that Professor Zelenak could evaluate the QTIP trust on the
merits. In the absence of such evaluation, his comments about the
feminist critique of the QTIP trust look like petty academic carping.
I contend that the QTIP trust cannot be defended on its own, wholly
apart from its being a trade-off for the unlimited marital deduction
(which is discussed in Part IV below).
An argument for QTIEP trusts (not linked to the unlimited
marital deduction) would be based on the core values that: (1) the
issue of marital property rights is one for the states to resolve, and (2)
a person should be able to dispose of his property as he sees fit
(without influence by federal tax law).
The federalism argument is a smokescreen. The pre-ERTA
estate-splitting marital deduction regime was enacted in 1948
40. Typically, if a widow elects against a will, she must forfeit all benefits obtained
under the will. See

WILLIAM

M. MCGOVERN,

JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES

122 n.60 (1988). Thus, even if the
widow received no benefits under a will other than an income interest in a QTIP trust in
the decedent husband's estate, a decision to elect against the will (and forfeit the interest
in the QTIP trust) would be a close call. See also infra note 56 (stating that most widows
choose to take the QTIP trust option rather than elect against the husband's will).
41. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
42. Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1543. Professor Zelenak admits that there is a certain
inconsistency between the premise underlying the QTIP trust (that the property is the
husband's) and the premise underlying the unlimited marital deduction (that the property
is "theirs"). See id. at 1545 (citing Gerzog, supra note 3, at 305 n.11). Neither author
questions the unlimited marital deduction.
INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS
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precisely to prevent federal tax law from influencing state property
regimes.43 In contrast, the federal QTIP trust provision can be seen
as a potential influence on the states to dilute the spousal election
against the will and to decline to move to a community property
regime.44
As to freedom of testation, marital deduction qualification rules
cannot avoid influencing the form of spousal transfers. But influence
is not compulsion. Unlike changes in state property law, marital
deduction qualification rules accommodate freedom of testation.
Since a QTIP trust gives the widow a low level of benefits while
giving the husband maximum control (without losing tax benefits), it
is not surprising that QTIP trusts are heavily favored by (wealthy)
husbands.45 Given that federal gift and estate tax rules inevitably
influence dispositive patterns, such influence should be as benign and
neutral as possible.
IV. THE QTIP TRUST WAS A BAD TRADE-OFF FOR THE
UNLIMITED MARITAL DEDUCTION

The QTIP trust was both proposed and enacted on the basis that
a QTIP trust in all of the husband's estate is at least as good as a fifty
percent outright share or power-of-appointment trust.4 6 It seems
highly unlikely that feminists can obtain repeal of the QTIP trust
without giving up the unlimited quality of the marital deduction,
since the two were closely linked upon enactment.47 Thus, it is
pertinent to inquire whether the unlimited quality of the marital
deduction is a good deal for wives and widows.
The 1969 QTIP proposals assumed a low exemption level." In
that context, an unlimited marital deduction coupled with a rule
requiring outright or power-of-appointment transfers would result in
the husband losing dispositive control over his entire estate.
However, starting in 1976 the exemption level (implemented by
43. See STEPHENS ET AL., supranote 10, at 5-117 to -118.
44. See supra note 33. But see 1993 N.Y. Laws 515 (codified at N.Y. EST. POVERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1A(a)(2), (4) (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1997)) (repealing a provision
that allowed a QTIP-type trust to preclude a spousal election against the will).
45. Of course, the QTIP trust would also be favored by wealthy wives who are
married to less wealthy husbands, although statistically a QTIP trust in this situation will
be less likely to take effect, since wives usually outlive husbands. Thus, the QTIP trust is
agreeable to the wealthier spouse, regardless of gender, which might explain why there
has been little political opposition to the QTIP trust.
46. See supranotes 8,19-20 and accompanying text.
47. See supranote 8 and accompanying text.
48. The exemption level was $60,000. See STEPHENS ETAL., supra note 10, at 5-3 n.1.
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means of the unified transfer tax credit) has risen greatly: from
$175,625 in 1981, to $1 million by the year 2006. 49 The Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997 added an estate exclusion for family businesses
and farms; this exclusion, when combined with the unified transfer
tax credit, will produce an aggregate exemption level of $1.3 million
per transferor for 1998 and later years." Thus, if the husband has the
right kind of property, he can make up to $1.3 million of
nondeductible transfers to third parties without tax.
As a general proposition, the unlimited marital deduction would
influence a husband desiring to eliminate all estate tax to leave a
marital deduction transfer equal to his net estate reduced by the
sizable exempted amount. (Such a transfer is herein referred to as
the "optimal" marital deduction.) If the husband's estate is less than
the exemption level, the marital deduction does not create any
inducement at all to make qualifying marital deduction bequests:
bequests to any person (widow or otherwise) are simply free of tax.
A husband would be interested in leaving a marital bequest in excess
of fifty percent only if his estate is very large and if he wishes to
reduce the tax on his own estate to zero.5 '
But it is also true that the maximum overall tax savings are
achieved with marital deduction transfers such that the potential
taxable estates of husband and wife are equalized 2 Estate
equalization is the estate planning alternative (for wealthy couples)
to the reduce-to-zero (optimal-marital-deduction) approach. The
conventional wisdom, however, is that the reduce-to-zero approach
using an optimal marital deduction is economically preferable to
estate equalization, because (if the widow lives long enough) the net
economic return on the taxes avoided at the husband's death earned
up to the wife's death should exceed the marginal taxes saved under
estate equalization. 3 But the conventional wisdom has been called
into question. 4 The numbers indeed favor the estate-equalization
49. See supra note 11.
50. See Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 502(a), 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (111 Stat.) 788, 847 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2033A (West Supp. 1998)).
51. See supra note 11 for an example of how an optimal marital deduction combines
with a non-marital transfer to eliminate tax.
52. With progressive rates, aggregate taxes are always minimized when the aggregate
tax base is allocated 50-50 to each spouse.
53. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. DODGE, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATE PLANNING 569-74
(1988) (setting forth calculations); Ordower, supra note 25, at 323-24 (setting forth
formula for judging whether deferral is preferable).
54. See Don W. Llewellyn et al., Computing the Optimum Marital Deduction: Is a
Zero-Tax Formula Appropriate?, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 331, 338-40 (1989);
Jeffrey N. Pennell & R. Mark Williamson, The Economics of PrepayingWealth Transfer
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approach for wealthy couples under the following assumptions: (1) a
progressive rate structure is in effect, and (2) the non-marital
transfers are not consumed. 5 In very large estates, these conditions
are likely to hold. Indeed, the "new math" is offered to the estate
planning community explicitly to facilitate giving the widow reduced
economic benefits in the husband's property.5 6 The message is that

husbands do not have to leave the widow more than an estate
equalization QTIP bequest in order to maximize the tax savings.
Similar considerations fatally undermine the claims of husbands
that the QTIP trust format is necessary to protect either their
freedom of testation or their children of a prior marriage; the
husband's interests are adequately protected under the estate
equalization format without the QTIP trust, because the husband
wholly controls the enjoyment and disposition of half of the total
wealth, and the widow (in the absence of the QTIP option) controls
and enjoys the other half. Indeed, if the wife has any wealth of her
own, estate equalization would induce the husband to effect marital
deduction transfers (entailing surrender of dispositive control) of less
than half of "his" wealth.5 7 Even if (mostly grown) children of prior
marriages deserve special congressional solicitation, this scenario is
not typical. Congress could have limited the use of QTIP trusts to
situations in which the remainder in fact is to pass to descendants of
58
prior marriages.
An ability to achieve equal estate-splitting (in large estates) not

Tax, TR. & EST., June 1997, at 49,49.
55. The non-marital trust avoids making distributions until the widow's death, so that
the accumulated income and appreciation will inure to the benefit of non-spousal
beneficiaries.
56. See Pennell & Williamson, supra note 54, at 51-52 (noting that a maximumdeferral marital deduction may give a widow more income than her husband wants her to
receive). Professor Pennell delivered a speech at the 1998 University of Miami Estate
Planning Institute entitled, "Minimizing the Surviving Spouse's Elective Share," the
theme being that most widows would swallow an estate-equalization QTIP rather than
elect against the husband's will. See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Address at the University of
Miami Philip E. Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning (January 7, 1998) (publication
forthcoming 32 U. MIAMI PHILIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN., ch. 8).
57. If the husband has wealth of $2 million and the wife $1 million, an estate
equalization limitation would induce the husband to leave $500,000 (out of his $2 million)
to the wife, leaving each of them at a wealth position of $1.5 million.
58. In at least two sections of the Uniform Probate Code, the share of the surviving
spouse is dependent on the parentage of the decedent's children. See UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-102 (revised 1990), 8 U.L.A. 81 (1998) (making the elective share of the
surviving spouse dependent on the parentage of the decedent's children); id. § 2-301, 8
U.L.A. at 133 (making the share of the surviving spouse excluded from the premarital will
equal to the intestate share of the estate not devised to the children of a prior marriage).
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only is generous in itself, but also is likely the most generous proposal
that can be justified normatively (that is, by analogy to community
property or to the shared-wealth concept invoked in conjunction with
the unlimited marital deduction). In addition, the estate-equalization
approach allows (if it does not require) husbands to give the widow
more benefits than exist under the marital deduction bequest without
causing inclusion of the extra benefits in the widow's gross estate.
Typically, the nonqualifying transfer is a trust (called a by-pass trust)
in which the widow has one or more income interests, limited powers
of disposition, the trusteeship (or co-trusteeship), and a possibility of
receiving income and/or corpus distributions pursuant to the trustee's
discretion or standards (such as "maintenance" or "comfort"). Such
a by-pass trust package is more favorable to the widow than a QTIP
trust, which does not allow for any power of inter vivos disposition.
Thus, it would be ludicrous to maintain that an estate plan under an
estate-splitting marital deduction limitation (without QTIP trusts)
must necessarily be less favorable to widows than even a 100%-ofhusband's-estate QTIP trust. The present qualification rules merely
set the parameters of the tax game; the level of benefits to be
received by the wife is basically up to the husband, independent of
the qualification rules.
Perhaps the most decisive argument against the QTIP trust is
that the widow's income-only interest in trust is not very valuable.
First, the concept of "income" under the law of trusts is narrower
than economic income: capital gains and appreciation are excluded.5 9
Second, the trustee's normal duty is to preserve the corpus against
erosion by inflation and to balance fairly the interests of the income
beneficiary and the remainder.'
These conditions produce a
situation in which a substantial portion of the economic return is (or
can be) devoted to the remainder interest. Third, trustees are subject
to the prudent investor rule constraining investments. 61 Fourth, the
"income" is net of trustee fees charged against income,62 an expense

59. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Acr § 3 (1962), 7B U.L.A. 154-55 (1985).
Trust accounting income can also be reduced by charges to depreciation, see id.
§ 13(a)(2), 7B U.L.A. at 176, and depletion reserves, see id. §§ 9-11, 7B U.L.A. at 168-72,
and can be exclusive of income accruing through original issue discount, see id. § 7(a), 7B
U.L.A. at 165-66.
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992) (requiring trustees to
conform to fiduciary standards, act with undivided loyalty, and in the sole interest of the
beneficiary).
62. See UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACr § 13(a) (1962), 7B U.L.A. at 175-76
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that would be eliminated if the widow owned the property outright.
The third and fourth points combine to suppress the total economic
return. Thus, in the mid-1990s, a QTIP trust beneficiary would be
likely to enjoy an income yield of only three or four percent of asset
value.63 This income is, of course, subject to income tax in the hands
of the widow.' 4 Using a four percent discount rate, an income
interest in trust for ten years (roughly the median survival period for
widows) 65 is worth only about thirty percent of the corpus. The
notion of a three or four percent "income" yield is now being touted
as a desirable norm in order to "preserve" corpus more effectively
against erosion. 66 Such a strategy in the context of an income-only
QTIP trust will have the effect of reducing the income to be
distributed to the widow and increasing the amount passing to third
parties. In addition, the widow's income right in a QTIP trust has
been eroded at the margins by recent cases and regulations.67
Finally, any tax savings attributable to the unlimited marital
deduction (which can occur only in large estates due to the generous
exemptions) will in most cases inure wholly to the benefit of the non-

(1985).
63. See Robert B. Wolf, Defeating the Duty to DisappointEqually-The Total Return
Trust, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 45, 51 (1997) (specifying yield of 3.9%, based on
1996 average federal mid-term yield of 6.5% and Standard & Poor's 500 equity dividend
yield of 2.0%).
64. One study indicated that, to preserve asset values against inflation, the maximum
"income" return of three percent after taxes would sufficiently avoid erosion of principal
(adjusted for inflation). See Roger Hertog & David A. Levine, Income Versus Wealth:
Making the Trade-Off,J. INVESTING, Spring 1996, at 5,12 (covering a 35-year period).
65. See TAx REFORM PROPOSALS 1969, supra note 3, at 260.
66. See William L. Hoisington, Modern Trust Design: New Paradigmsfor the 21st
Century, 31 U. MIAMI INST. EST. PLAN. 6-1, 6-10 to 6-13 (1997) (discussing financial
managers' preoccupation with capital protection and the "total return" investment
strategy).
67. See Commissioner v. Estate of Hubert, 117 S. Ct. 1124, 1133-34 (1997) (holding
that the marital deduction is not reduced in which estate administration expenses are
charged against the income of a marital bequest and deducted for income tax purposes);
Estate of Robertson v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 779, 781 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
marital deduction is not lost when executor had discretionary power to choose between
funding a deductible trust and a nondeductible trust); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(d)(4)
(1994) (stating income interest not disqualified when trust provides that income between
last distribution date and widow's death is payable to third party); Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)-7T(d)(3)(ii), -7T(h) ex. 6 (1997) (stating income interest not disqualified
when trust provides that widow is to receive the income from only that portion of the
QTIP trust for which the QTIP election is made). See generally Wendy C. Gerzog, Estate
of Clack. Adding Insult to Injury, or More Problems with the QTIP Tax Provisions,6 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 221 (1996) (discussing the effect of Estate of Clack v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C. 31 (1996), which allows a widowed spouse's trust income to be
dependent on the executor's determination).
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marital-deduction transfers, since any taxes would otherwise be
charged to such transfers.6 8 Thus, the widow will rarely benefit from
any incremental tax savings attributable to an unlimited marital
deduction; any tax savings that do augment the QTIP trust will
benefit the widow only in proportion to the value of her income-only
interest in such trust.
A deduction that neither provides a tax incentive to benefit
widows (beyond about three percent in half of the couple's aggregate
wealth) nor gives widows a significant economic stake in any tax
savings that result from the system hardly deserves to be called a
"marital deduction."
V. CAN THE UNLIMITED MARITAL DEDUCTION BE
INDEPENDENTLY JUSTIFIED?

Some theories have been advanced for an unlimited marital
deduction that are not accurate explanations of current law, are not
normatively justified, or are not practical. For reasons of space, I wil
deal with them only briefly.
The first is the idea that the unlimited marital deduction
embodies the notion that husband and wife belong to the same
taxable unit.69 The marital-unit model is premised on the assumption
that married couples view earnings and property as "theirs," as
opposed to "his" or "hers." As a factual description, this view of
control is doubtful-even with regard to community property7 especially among the wealthy.' Even assuming that the idea of joint
control is a desirable property norm, in practice, during a viable
marriage, control over earnings and property within a given
household will be governed more by personalities and the informal
dynamics of the relationship than by legal rules. Finally, the concept
of "sharing" implies fifty-fifty ownership, which in turn would justify
68. The exception would be when the taxes saved to the husband's estate are greater
than the amount of non-marital transfers to which such taxes could have been charged.
Thanks to the large exemptions and the fact that an estate-equalization plan is generally
preferable to a reduce-to-zero plan, this exception should rarely apply.
69. See H.R. REP. No. 97-201, at 159 (1981), reprintedin U.S. Cong. Serial Set, Serial
No. 13432, at 159 (1981).
70. Legally, community earnings and community property can be consumed, sold, or
disposed of by gift (subject to some constraints) by whichever spouse (or perhaps both of
them) is the "manager" of such property. See generally WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. &
CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 6-7, 205-50 (2d
ed. 1982) (discussing control of community property).
71. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Marriage, and the IRS: Family, IncomeSharing,and the JointIncome Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 80-91 (1993).
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an estate equalization scheme.
In any event, for estate and gift tax purposes, husband and wife
are clearly separate taxpayers with separate schedules and exemption
levels. Implementation of the marital-unit theory would require the
imposition, upon the death of the second spouse, of a tax on the
aggregatetax base of both spouses combined.7 Such an aggregate tax
base would raise the issue of an appropriate rate schedule. A jointreturn type of solution 73 is unworkable due to the fact that spouses
can divorce, and surviving (or divorced) spouses can remarry, so that
a person could serially belong to more than one marital (or nonmarital) unit. Treating each such unit as a separate taxpayer would
undermine progressivity, especially in the case of those who take
marriage and divorce casually. Alternatively, the basic taxable unit
for rate purposes could remain with the individual over his or her
lifetime, but each marriage, divorce, and remarriage could entail a
reallocation and perhaps modification of a person's transfer tax
attributes. It is interesting to speculate about such a system, but it
would be excessively cumbersome relative to whatever good it might
accomplish.74
The second theory is that the unlimited marital deduction
"defers tax" until the widow's death. But if there were true tax
deferral, the husband's cumulative gift and estate tax liability would
be figured without regard to any marital deduction, and such liability
would be deferred, with interest, until the widow's death. 75 Indeed,
the deferral rationale in its naked form suggests that any transfer by
the husband-even an outright gift to a third party-is entitled to
deferral.76 In reality, the marital deduction shifts all or a portion of
the husband's tax base to the widow's tax base. In other words, it
defers not the tax but rather a portion of the aggregate tax base. The
implied justification is that somehow widows as a group benefit from
deferral, but (as noted above) that is hardly the case under the post-

72 See Gutman, supra note 24, at 1223.
73. This would entail a "halved" rate schedule and double exemptions for the
aggregate estate.
74. Transfer tax attributes would include the (unused) unified transfer tax credit and
the amount of "adjusted taxable gifts" that enter into the calculation of post-termination
gift and estate tax liability. The problems of aggregating and disaggregating marital units
occupy 20 pages in one commentary. See Gutman, supranote 24, at 1219-39.
75. Of course, such a system would not provide any inducement to prefer spousal
transfers to non-spousal transfers.
76. This point is made by Howard E. Abrams, A Reevaluation of the Terminable
Interest Rule, 39 TAX L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1983), as well as by Gerzog, supra note 3, at 318-
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ERTA system, which actually has the effect of favoring the
successors of married couples relative to those of nonmarried
individuals. As far as I know, no justification has been attempted for
this result, nor can I conceive of any.
A third theory is that the unlimited marital deduction
implements the overriding principle of one tax per generation.
Whatever the dubious merits of such a principle, 77 the present system,
through the generation-skipping tax,7 seeks to assure only that the
tax is imposed no less than once a generation.79 Otherwise, there is
no other feature of the transfer tax system that refers to generational
status. There are no exemptions for same-generation or "backward
flowing" transfers. The problem of too frequent imposition of tax can
better be mitigated by a provision like I.R.C. § 2013, which is keyed
to the number of years between deaths,80 than a generational rule. In
the fairly common situation in which the widow outlives her husband
by more than ten years,8 ' I.R.C. §2013 in its current form would not
77. The generation idea might be thought to produce some kind of horizontal equity
in the sense, say, that all persons receiving bequests in 1998 will be treated equally
because the wealth will have been taxed roughly the same number of times. See Tax
Reform, 1969: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 91st Cong. 3980
(1969) (statement of Jerome Kurtz, practitioner and professor) (arguing that promoting
equity in estate taxes requires that "comparable fortunes be subjected to the tax at
relatively comparable time intervals"). However, this description of the situation
erroneously assumes that all wealth acquired by gratuitous accession in 1998 is of (nearly)
the same vintage. Moreover, the norm of equal taxation of lineages (as opposed to
individuals) is problematic. Another argument might be that the idea of a wealth transfer
tax is to approximate an annualwealth tax and that imposing the wealth transfer tax once
per generation is a crude way of averaging. But a wealth transfer tax can be designed so
as to take into account the transferor's actual holding period of assets. See Joseph M.
Dodge II, The Taxation of Wealth and Wealth Transfers: Where Do We Go After ERTA?,
34 RUTGERS L. REV. 738, 760-68 (1982). In any event, it is not clear that an annual
wealth tax is the appropriate norm. A wealth transfer tax might well be preferable on
both economic and administrative efficiency grounds. The generational idea does not
relate at all to the following rationales for the current transfer tax system: (1) raising
revenue, (2) levying an excise on the privilege of transferring wealth, (3) breaking up
undue concentrations of wealth, and (4) enhancing the progressivity of the income tax.
78. See I.R.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & West Supp. 1998).
79. Alternatively, the generation-skipping tax could be based on the idea of
successive beneficial enjoyment, regardless of generational status. See Joseph M. Dodge,
Substantial Ownership and Substance Versus Form: Proposals for the Unification. of
FederalEstate and Gift Taxes andfor the Taxation of Generation-SkippingTransfers, 1976
U. ILL. L.F. 657, 670-77.
80. See I.R.C. § 2013(a) (West Supp. 1998). Section 2013 allows a credit against the
estate tax of the second decedent for any estate tax "on" estate transfers to the second
decedent by an earlier decedent. See id. The credit is 100% of the earlier tax if the
deaths are less than two years apart; the credit is scaled down for longer intervals, and
disappears if the interval is greater than 10 years. See id.
81. Statistics on survival are cited in part three of TAX REFORM PROPOSALS 1969,

1746

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

help. Finally, and most importantly, the generation idea does not
mandate an unlimited marital deduction; small and moderate wealth
is already exempt from tax, regardless of relationship, and for
wealthy couples an estate-splitting approach can achieve the result of
one tax per couple, since nondeductible transfers by the husband can
be made in a form that avoids inclusion in the widow's tax base.'
A fourth theory is that the purpose of the marital deduction is to
provide economic benefits to widows. From a pure welfare
perspective, however, any exclusion above what is necessary to allow
the widow to live comfortably is not justified.' In any event, the
welfare rationale has been pre-empted by the unified transfer tax
credit, which essentially accomplishes the same goal."4 A $625,000
outright bequest translates into an annuity of about $89,000 per year
for ten years or $69,000 per year for fifteen years.85 Even if there
were no credit (and assuming that there are other legatees), the
widow would have no guarantee of benefiting from the tax savings
attributable to an optimal marital deduction. 6 Finally, an estatesplitting marital deduction assures that the widow will obtain no less
than half of the before-tax wealth of the couple. s7
VI. A DEDUCnON FOR THE VALUE OF INTERESTS TRANSFERRED
TO SPOUSES?

It has been proposed by Professor Gerzog (among others) that
the amount of the marital deduction should equal the value of the
interests in property that the wife or widow obtains from the
husband.
In contrast to the current system, which allows a
deduction equal to the full amount of the property in a QTIP trust,

supra note 3, at 260.
82. See supra text following note 58.
83. See Westfall, supra note 21, at 989 (noting that the marital deduction applies
without regard to the size of the decedent's estate); id. at 996 (contending that the size of
the marital deduction should depend on the need of the widow).
84. It is noteworthy that there is no provision exempting transfers to destitute
orphans. The orphan's deduction, former I.R.C. § 2057, was repealed in 1981 precisely
because the unified transfer tax credit was deemed to be sufficient. See Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 427(a), 95 Stat. 172,318, reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. (95 Stat.) 172,318 (repealing previous I.R.C. § 2057).
85. These figures assume a discount rate of seven percent. Ten years appears to be
about the mean period of survival by widows. See supra note 3.
86. See supra text accompanying note 68.
87. Any taxes on the "taxable" portion of the husband's estate will be charged to that
portion, because charging the tax to the marital deduction transfer will reduce the marital
deduction. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1998).
88. See Gerzog, supra note 3, at 302 n.6.
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the proposal would result, when the husband leaves the wife or
widow a life estate, in a deduction limited to the actuarial value of the
life estate as of the husband's death.89 The rationale is that the
marital deduction should equal only the value of what the widow or
wife gets.
The deduction-equals-value approach has seductive appeal, but
it is ultimately a bad idea. From the feminist perspective, it would do
little to inhibit a husband from using a spousal income-only trust.
Giving wives special powers of appointment or naming them as
trustees would be discouraged, since powers would not possess any
value. The deductible amount would be a function of the widow's life
expectancy, which would create an irrational incentive structure.
Most importantly, estate planners would greatly favor income-only
trusts because income-only interests are, under the estate and gift tax
actuarial tables, greatly overvalued.90 Thus, the husband's deduction
would far exceed (on average) the real value of the widow's benefit
in present value terms. Moreover, reliance on actuarial tables allows
gaming of the system: the excess of the deductible amount over the
present value of what widows actually receive would widen if the
widow dies prematurely or the trust can shift economic return from
"income" to capital appreciation, which benefits the remainder
interest. Finally, the "estate trust" would become the misogynist's
dream: a 100% deduction, but no guarantee that the widow will
receive any benefits during life.91
The only airtight solution that prevents actuarial manipulation
would be a qualification rule that would require an outright transfer,
a power-of-appointment trust, or an annuity for a term of yearsY2
89. See Abrams, supra note 76, at 18; Gutman, supra note 24, at 1256; Joseph
Isenbergh, Simplifying Retained Life Interests, Revocable Transfers, and the Marital
Deduction, 51 U. Cm!. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1984).
90. The actual before-tax rate of "income" return for trusts in 1996 was 3.9%. See
supra note 63. The mid-term applicable federal rate for November 1997 was 6.01%. See
RESEARCH INST. OF AM., RIA FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK 89 (1997). Section 7520(a)(2)
prescribes a discount rate in valuing interests equal to 120% of the federal mid-term rate.
See I.R.C. § 7520(a)(2) (1994). Thus, the statutory discount rate can be more than twice
the "real" discount rate in a trust. The higher the discount rate, the higher the value of
income interests.
91. The estate trust is described supra in note 9. The estate trust would be fully
deductible, since (in the property law sense) no interest is transferred to any person other
than the widow and/or her estate. In practice, the widow has testamentary control, but

that, standing alone, might have little utility to her, especially if the natural objects of her
bounty are the same as her husband's. A widow's interest in an estate trust equals 100%
of the initial corpus, because the widow "owns" both the remainder interest and the
(accumulated) income interest.
92. Another option is a unitrust (fixed percentage of corpus valued annually) for a
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The term-annuity option would be unappealing both to the husband,
since a widow dying prematurely could control the disposition of the
unpaid account balance, and to the widow, who might outlive the
annuity period.
VII. CONCLUSION
The analysis of both the post-ERTA system and the deductionequals-value alternative leads to the conclusion that the optimal
solution is to abolish the QTIP trust (and the estate trust) and to

allow qualification only for outright transfers and (perhaps) powerof-appointment trusts.

The unlimited marital deduction could be

kept for gift tax purposes for reasons of administrative simplicity.
For estate tax purposes, the unlimited marital deduction should be
replaced by an estate-equalization limitation. This system would

create a community-property-like template for interspousal transfers,
a template that already is the property regime governing about thirty
percent of the population, 93 and would reasonably accommodate the
interests of both husbands and wives.
Of course, as Professor Zelenak points out, tax is not everything.
The best marital deduction scheme would not be as effective in
securing the interests of wives as would the optimal legal regime
pertaining to marital property rights and succession. Autonomy
feminists should be especially skeptical of the institution of the trust
and other forms of long-term, dead-hand control. 94

term of years. However, the unitrust percentage could be set quite low (two to four
percent) in order to preserve corpus for the remainders. A rule that required a minimum
unitrust percentage (say, five percent) would be deemed unacceptable by the estate
planning community, since it would typically result in the erosion of corpus. See supra
note 64.
93. See supra note 38.

94. Cf. Ordower, supra note 25, at 329-37 (discussing factors that influence decisions
of after-death control and urging estate planners to resist client urges to exert maximum
dead-hand control).

